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FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
AGAINST GOVERNMENT COMPELLED
EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION t
DAVID B. GAEBLER *
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people
peaceably to assemble . . ."' The primary concern in most litigation arising
under this constitutional guarantee has been to protect individuals from
government interference with their ability to communicate or associate.' In
some contexts, however, the first amendment's commitment to freedom of
belief and expression has led to protection not only of the right to speak or to
associate freely, but also to protection of a corollary right not to speak or
associate at all — that is a right to be free from government compulsion to
engage in speech or associational activities. 3 For convenience, the more
t Copyright © 1982 by Boston College Law School.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston College of Law; A.B. 1970, Har-
vard University; J.D. 1973, University of Wisconsin.
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). However, freedom of association as pro-
tected by the first amendment may be limited to association for the purpose of engaging in activi-
ty independently protected by the first amendment. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW S 12-23, at 700-03 (1978).
3 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (compelled financial support
of collective bargaining representative when funds used for political purposes unrelated to collec-
tive bargaining); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state requirement that plaintiff
display on his automobile a license plate imprinted with the state motto); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U, S. 624 (1943) (compulsory recitation of pledge of allegiance).
The first amendment protection against government compulsion to engage in expres-
sion or associational activities afforded in the Abood, Wooley and Barnette cases must be distin-
guished from first and fifth amendment protection of other interests which might also be de-
scribed, though perhaps somewhat inaccurately, as involving a "right not to speak." For exam-
ple, the first amendment has been invoked to prevent the coerced disclosure of individuals'
organizational affiliations. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rd. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The
reason for this protection is that disclosure might subject the individuals involved to harassment
which in turn might discourage them from participating in unpopular organizations, thereby
chilling free exercise of the right of association. See Baird, 401 U.S. at 6-7; Shelton, 364 U.S. at
485-87; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-63.
The fifth amendment provides similar protection against compelled disclosure of cer-
tain information. Under the fifth amendment an individual cannot be compelled to give informa-
tion which he reasonably believes may be used against him in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g.,
Leflcowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968);
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Unlike the first amendment protection afforded in
Shelton and NAACP, however, the fifth amendment right not to speak does not bar compelled
testimony if the individual is given immunity. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972).
By contrast the general first amendment right to be free from government compulsion
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familiar rights to speak and to associate will be referred to as affirmative rights
or interests, and their protection as affirmative protection. Similarly, rights not
to speak or associate will be referred to as negative rights, and their protection
as negative protection.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt explicitly with protection of
negative first amendment interests in only a few cases. 4 In those cases,
however, the Court has not focused adequately on the distinct nature of the in-
fringement of individual interests where government compels rather than in-
hibits expression. Moreover, the Court lacks consensus as to the appropriate
approach to balancing opposing government and individual interests in
negative first amendment cases. This article will begin by surveying the cases
in which the Court has considered negative first amendment interests. This
survey will reveal that while the Court has identified several factors to be con-
sidered in evaluating these cases it has not articulated a consistent approach to
to engage in expression or associational activities, as enunciated in Abood, Wooley and Barnetle, is
not limited to non-disclosure of particular information. Rather it protects against compelled ex-
pression or association of any sort so long as it is not outweighed by a countervailing government
interest. See infra text and notes at notes 124-45. Moreover, first amendment protection against
compelled expression is provided not simply as a means of avoiding a chilling effect on the exer-
cise of the rights to speak and associate, but rather to protect against government invasion of the
"sphere of intellect and spirit." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943). See infra text and notes at notes 58-73.
4
 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
There are other cases, however, which superficially appear to protect a right to refrain
from speech or association, but which do so in circumstances where such protection is necessary
to protect the more traditional first amendment rights to speak or associate freely. See Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
Elrod involved employees in the county sherrifrs office who were required to pledge their political
allegiance to the political party of the sheriff in order to keep their jobs. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350-51.
The Court found that this requirement infringed upon the freedoms of belief and association and
held that it was unconstitutional except as applied to policymaking employees. Id. at 372-73. In
reaching this conclusion the Elrod Court appears to have relied in part on a first amendment right
to be free from coercion regarding belief and association:
The financial and campaign assistance that he is induced to provide to another party
furthers the advancement of that party's policies to the detriment of his party's
views and ultimately his own beliefs, and any assessment of his salary is tantamount
to coerced belief . . . . Even a pledge of allegiance to another party, however osten-
sible, only serves to compromise the individual's true beliefs.
Id. at 355.
However, Elrod does not depend on such protection to support its result. In fact the decision
can easily be justified on more traditional first amendment grounds. As the Court noted, one of
the restraints on freedom of association was that an employee could maintain affiliation with, or
work for, the out-party only at the risk of losing his job. Id. at 355. Moreover as the Court
pointed out:
[s]ince the average employee is hardly in the financial position to support his party
and another, or to lend his time to two parties, the individual's ability to act accord-
ing to his beliefs and to associate with others of his political persuasion is con-
strained, and support for his party is diminished.
Id. at 355-56. Thus the patronage system held unconstitutional in Elrod involved a substantial
chilling effect upon exercise of traditional first amendment rights to speak and associate.
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negative first amendment issues. Next the article will discuss the nature of
negative first amendment interests and suggest that the primary interest in-
volved is the interest of the individual in his own selfhood. The article will then
suggest an approach to evaluating the seriousness of any claimed infringement
of this interest. Such an evaluation is necessary to permit a reasoned balancing
of any infringement of individual negative first amendment interests against
any countervailing state interests. Finally the suggested approach will be ap-
plied to reexamine the most troublesome negative first amendment case the
Court has yet encountered, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,' which involved
compelled financial support of expression. It will be concluded that the Court's
failure to develop a consistent approach to negative first amendment issues,
and more specifically the Court's lack of consensus in Abood, 6 results from a
failure to focus sufficiently on the nature of negative first amendment interests
and a consequent inability to evaluate adequately the magnitude of any
infringement of those interests.
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND NEGATIVE FIRST
AMENDMENT INTERESTS
The United States Supreme Court first articulated a theory of negative
first amendment protection in 1943, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.' This case involved a requirement by the State Board of Education
that teachers and students salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance. 9
Students refusing to comply were subject to expulsion for insubordination,
rendering the student liable to proceedings for delinquency and his parents or
guardian liable to prosecution. 9
 The plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to
salute the flag on religious grounds."' The Court, reversing itself from three
years earlier," held that the flag salute requirement violated the first amend-
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. o. Tornillo the Court struck down a Florida statute requir-
ing a newspaper to publish, free of charge, replies by political candidates attacked or criticized in
the newspaper. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244, 258. Like the decision in Elrod, however, the Tornillo
decision can be explained on traditional first amendment grounds. The Court reasoned that the
right to reply statute inflicted a content-based penalty upon a newspaper because the newspaper
had to bear the financial cost of publishing the replies. Id. at 256-58. Moreover, to make space for
a reply a newspaper must omit something else, because as a practical matter a newspaper does
not have unlimited space. Id. The Court stressed that to escape these penalties a newspaper
might simply avoid publishing anything which might give rise to the right to reply. Id. at 256-58.
But see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding an FCC rule requir-
ing radio broadcasters to provide free reply time for replies to personal attacks and political
editorials).
5 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
6 Compare Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (plurality opinion) with
id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
7 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
8 Id. at 626.
9
 Id. at 629.
° Id.
" Three years before the Barnette decision the Court had upheld a flag-salute require-
ment. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
998	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:995
ment." Because the plaintiffs had refused to salute the flag for religious
reasons," the decision might have been based upon the free exercise clause.
Nevertheless, the plurality expressly declined to limit its decision to religiously
motivated refusals." Noting that "[o]bjection to this form of communication
when coerced is an old one, well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights,"
the Court held that the government could not constitutionally force an in-
dividual to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance regardless of the
nature of the individual's objections.' 6
 The Court summed up its position in
the famous words of Mr. Justice Jackson:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no of-
ficial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to US. I7
Barnette announced first amendment protection from government compul-
sion to express, by word or act, acceptance of or agreement with any particular
belief. The precise scope of this protection, however, has not been defined. In
part, this results from the fact that despite the Barnette Court's express reliance
on a general first amendment right to be free from government compulsion to
express particular beliefs, at least two other sufficient explanations for protec-
tion are often present in similar cases: (1) that punishing an individual for
refusal to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance when the refusal is
based on religious grounds violates the free exercise clause; and (2) that refusal
to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance may constitute an affirmative
act expressing dissent, in other words, symbolic speech by silence." Lower
court decisions since Barnette involving similar facts display a melange of these
rationales. 19
12 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
" Id. at 629.
14 Id. at 634-35.
15 Id. at 633.
15 Id. at 635, 642.
" Id. at 642.
18 The first amendment's protection of expression is not limited to words; it extends to
symbolic speech as well. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Cf. United States v. O'Brien,.391 U.S. 367, 376,
386 (1968) (the Court stated that even assuming O'Brien's act of burning his draft card was con-
duct protected by the first amendment, the statute constitutionally could prohibit destruction of
the draft card for non speech-related reasons); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (the
right to protest by silent presence in a segregated public library).
lc' See Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 638 (2nd Cir. 1973); Russo v. Central School
Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 631 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Hanover v. Northrup,
325 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D. Conn. 1970); Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285,
294-96 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated for entry of a fresh decree, 401 U.S. 988 (1971), aff 'd after remand, 450
F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 30-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Sheldon v.
Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775-76 (D. Ariz. 1963). See also Comment, Compelled Expression:
Maynard v. Wooley, 28 ME. L. REV. 531 (1976).
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amendment protection until 1977 in Wooley v. Maynard." The plaintiff in Wooley
objected to displaying on his license plate the New Hampshire state motto,
"Live Free or Die," and therefore covered the motto with tape. 21 Subsequent-
ly the plaintiff was charged with and convicted of a misdemeanor for "know-
ingly [obscuring] . . . the figures or letters on any number plate. "22 Despite the
conviction the plaintiff persisted in taping over the motto on his license plate
and was convicted twice more." Finally he commenced a federal action seeking
to enjoin further enforcement of the statute which made his conduct a criminal
offense. 21 A three-judge district court found that plaintiff's conduct constituted
symbolic speech and that no state interest was shown sufficient to justify this
restriction of plaintiff's affirmative first amendment interests." The Supreme
Court expressly declined to rule on the symbolic speech issue and chose in-
stead, as in Barnette, to base its decision on plaintiff's negative first amendment
interests. 26 Although the plaintiff in Wooley was not compelled to express
anything either orally or by gesticulation, the Court held that the first amend-
ment protected his right to refuse to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message displayed upon his license plate." The Court considered
the state's asserted interests in the requirement but concluded that they could
not justify the infringement of plaintiff's negative first amendment interests."
In reaching its conclusion, the Wooley Court cited Barnette in support of the
proposition that the first amendment protects the right to refrain from speaking
at al1. 29 Merely displaying a message on one's license plate, however, is a much
less intimate form of expression and requires a far lesser degree of personal in-
volvement than the pledge of allegiance requirement in Barnette. Accordingly,
the Court conceded that Wooley involved a less serious infringement of indi-
vidual interests than had Barnette." Nevertheless, the Court characterized the
difference as merely one of degree because even carrying the state motto on his
license plate forced the plaintiff in Wooley, as part of his daily life, to foster an
20 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
21 W00197, 430 U.S. at 707-08.
22 Id. at 707.
23 Id. at 708.
24 Id. at 709.
25 Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. •Supp. 1381, 1387-89 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
26 430 U.S. at 713. The Court did express some doubt, however, as to whether
Maynard's conduct in fact constituted symbolic speech. Id. at 713 & n.10.
27 Id. at 713, 717.
28 Id. at 716-17. The state argued that the requirement facilitated the determination
that passenger vehicles carried the proper plates (only passenger vehicles were required to display
license plates imprinted with the state motto) and that it promoted appreciation of history, in-
dividualism and state pride. Id. The Court concluded that these assertions were insufficient to
outweigh the infringement of the plaintiff's first amendment interests because passenger vehicle
license plates were already otherwise distinguishable and there were other ways to promote ap-
preciation of history, individualism and state pride which would be less restrictive. Id. at 716-17.
29 Id. at 714-15.
20 Id. at 715.
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ideological point of view which he opposed." The Court distinguished the ap-
pearance of the motto "In God We Trust" on United States currency, arguing
that currency is not so readily associated with its owner as an automobile and
that since it is normally carried in a purse or pocket the individual is not forced
to advertise the motto. 32
 Thus, by making this distinction, the Court hinted
that there might be no infringement of first amendment interests where the
level of personal involvement was small enough to render any connection be-
tween the individual and the message sufficiently remote.
Only a month after the Wooley decision the Court again found a violation
of negative first amendment rights in Abood b. Detroit Board of Education." Abood
involved objections by public school teachers to the agency shop provision in
the collective bargaining agreement that governed their employment." Pur-
suant to state statute a union selected by a majority of the teachers became the
exclusive representative of all the teachers, union members and non-members
alike." The agency shop provision required all nonunion teachers represented
by the union, including plaintiffs, as a condition of continued employment, to
pay to the union service fees equal to the regular dues paid by union
members. 36 The service fees were intended to prevent union non-members
from receiving a "free ride" by obtaining the benefits of collective bargaining
without bearing their share of the costs." The plaintiffs alleged, however, that
the union used the service fees in part to finance political and ideological ac-
tivities unrelated to collective bargaining."
The Court held that requiring plaintiffs to give financial support to
political and ideological activities," indeed requiring them to support finan-
cially their collective bargaining representative, implicated first amendment in-
terests. 40 Reasoning that use of service fees for political and ideological ac-
tivities unrelated to collective bargaining did not further the government in-
terest in elimination of "free riders,"" the Court held that any such use of
" Id.
37 Id. at 717 n.15. See also Arrow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970); O'Hair
v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979).
" 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Interestingly the Abood Court did not even refer to the Wooig
case.
34 Id. at 212-13.
35 Id. at 212 & n.1. Such exclusive representation is common and is a basic principle in
federal labor law. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 374-81 (1976).
36 Abood, 431 U.S. at 212.
" Id. at 221-22.
n Id. at 213, 241.
" Id. at 235-36.
4° Id. at 222.
4 ' Id. at 220-23. The Court's reasoning was drawn from its earlier decision in Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In Sired the Court had acknowledged
that Congress had authorized union shop in order to deal with the problem of "free riders," id. at
767, and went on to state:
to support candidates for public office, and advance political programs, is not a use
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service fees would violate plaintiffs' first amendment rights." On the other
hand, the Court approved the use of service fees for collective bargaining pur-
poses, though, by concluding that the infringement of individual first amend-
ment interests was outweighed by the government interest in promoting labor
peace by elimination of "free riders." 4"
The Court most recently considered negative first amendment interests in
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins." In Pruneyard the plaintiffs set up a table in
the Pruneyard Shopping Center and began to distribute pamphlets and collect
signatures .on petitions opposing a United Nations resolution against Zionism.+"
Although their activity was peaceful, a Pruneyard security guard asked them to
leave." Subsequently they brought suit to enjoin Pruneyard from denying
them access for purposes of circulating their petitions." The California
Supreme Court ruled that circulation of petitions on the premises of privately
owned shopping centers was protected by the California Constitution." On ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court, Pruneyard argued that under Wooley
a. Maynard it could not be compelled to use its property as a forum for the
which helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or administration of collective
agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances or disputes. In
other words, it is use which falls clearly outside the reasons advanced by the unions
and accepted by Congress why authority to make union-shop agreements was
justified.
Id. at 768.
47 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-37.
" Id. at 232. This holding requires that a distinction be drawn between collective
bargaining activities and political and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining. In
the public sector this distinction is particularly difficult to draw because public sector collective
bargaining is inherently political. The Court acknowledged this difficulty. Id. at 236. For a
discussion of this problem see Gaebler, Union Political Activity or Collective Bargaining? First Amend-
ment Limitations on the Uses of Union Shop Funds, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 591 (1981).
" 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980). Consolidated Edison involved a challenge to a Public Service Commission rule
prohibiting Consolidated Edison from including political inserts in its bills. Id. at 532. The Com-
mission defended the rule, inter alia, on the ground that the utility's practice of including political
inserts in its bills forced the ratepayers to subsidize distribution of the utility's message. Id. at
543. The Court, however, dismissed this argument by simply asserting that in the absence of a
showing that the Commission could not exclude the cost of the bill inserts from the rate base there
was no need to consider the claim. Id. at 543 & n.13. Yet, even if additional costs resulting from
the extra material were excluded from the rate base, the utility would still get a "free ride." To
eliminate any ratepayer subsidization it would be necessary either to prohibit the utility from in-
cluding the inserts, as the Commission did, or to exclude the cost of mailing bills from the rate
base altogether. Thus, for the Court to conclude that there was no occasion to decide whether
Abood prohibited forcing ratepayers to subsidize utility political advertising seems incorrect. See
Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A Fairness Solution for a Competitive Imbalance, to
be published in 1982 Wis. L. REV.
45 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 77.
46 Id,
47 Id. at 77.
43 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Ca1.3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347
(1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Such a right of access to private property is not protected by the
federal Constitution. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976). However, the Court did
recognize such a right at one time. Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 313
(1968).
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speech of others and that therefore the California Court's construction of the
California Constitution violated Pruneyard's federal constitutional rights."
The Supreme Court disagreed with appellants' position." It found three
factors distinguishing Pruneyard from Woo/g." First, because the shopping
center was open to the public the Court concluded that the views expressed by
others, even though on shopping center property, would not likely be associ-
ated with the shopping center owners. 52
 Second, because no specific message
was dictated by the state the Court saw no danger of governmental discrimina-
tion for or against any particular views." Finally, the Court noted that the
shopping center owners were entirely free to disavow publicly any connection
with or approval of the message contained in the petitions. 54
Although the Court took care to distinguish between Pruneyard and Wooley
it did not address the more difficult question of whether Pruneyard can be recon-
ciled with Abood. In Abood the Court held that for government to compel an in-
dividual to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he opposes in-
fringes upon individual first amendment interests, and that, at least in the ab-
sence of an overriding government interest, such compelled subsidization is
unconstitutional. 55
 The compelled subsidy in Abood took the form of required
financial contributions. Nevertheless, requiring the shopping center owners in
Pruneyard to permit use of their property as a forum for speech by others consti-
tutes a similar compulsion to subsidize ideological activity. Thus it is interest-
ing that the only reference to Abood by the Pruneyard Court appears in Justice
Powell's concurring opinion. Justice Powell acknowledged the potential con-
flict between Pruneyard and Abood, but dismissed it because the issue had not
been raised by the litigants. 56
Whether or not all of these decisions can be harmonized, the Court has yet
to articulate any consistent general approach to negative first amendment is-
sues. While the Court has suggested several factors to distinguish among these
cases," it has not adequately explained why these distinctions should be im-
portant in the negative first amendment context. The reason for this failure to
49 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 85-88 (1980).
'° Id. at 88.
51 Id. at 87-88.
52 Id.
53 Id.
" Id.
" See supra text and notes at notes 33-43.
56 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 98-99 n.2 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Although Justice Powell did not discuss at length any possible distinction between
Pruneyard and Abood he did note that the shopping center owners in Pruneyard had not alleged that
they opposed the message contained in the petitions circulated on shopping center property. Id.
This distinction is not persuasive, however, because in Abood the Court had held that it was suffi-
cient for the plaintiffs to allege that they opposed use of their compelled contributions for any
political or ideological activity. To require more specific allegations would deprive the plaintiffs
of the right to keep their views to themselves. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241
(1977).
57 See sup-a text and notes at notes 51-54.
July 1982]	 FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION	 1003
develop a consistent approach is that the Court has not focused sufficiently on
the distinct nature of the injury to individual interests caused when the govern-
ment compels, rather than prohibits, expression. To evaluate the usefulness of
the factors suggested by the Court, it is necessary to begin with an analysis of
the infringement of individual interests arising from government compelled ex-
pression.
II. THE NATURE AND ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS
A. Negative First Amendment Interests
Courts and commentators have attempted frequently to describe the pur-
poses of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression. Prominent
among these explanations has been the notion that freedom of expression pro-
motes intelligent self-government by insuring the opportunity for full and
robust discussion of matters of public concern." Closely related to this notion is
the thought that freedom of expression facilitates the advancement of
knowledge and the discovery of truth generally. 59 These thoughts are frequent-
ly expressed in terms of maintaining a "free marketplace for ideas" in which
all views compete for acceptance."
Government prohibition of expression inevitably interferes with the pres-
ervation of a "free marketplace for ideas." Consequently it is not necessary to
search further to explain invocation of the first amendment to strike down
government prohibitions of expression. However, when government compels
rather than prohibits expression there is not the same conflict with the policy of
preserving an opportunity for full and free discussion. Compulsion to express a
particular view does not by itself preclude the opportunity to disavow whatever
one has been compelled to express. Thus, Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in
Barnette, argued that requiring school children to salute the flag did not violate
the first amendment because it did not in any way restrict their opportunity to
disavow publicly the meaning others might attach to their compliance with the
requirement." He noted that all channels of affirmative free expression re-
mained open to the plaintiffs, and stated that, were that not true, he would be
the first to find the restriction violative of the first amendment." Nevertheless,
58 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1976); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). See also T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-11 (1963); A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 12-1.
59 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also EMERSON, supra note 58,
at 7-8; TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 12-1.
60 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 12-1, at
576-77.
61 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 663-64 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the Court rejected this argument and concluded that the requirement of the
flag salute and pledge violated the first amendment."
Even though Justice Frankfurter's argument did not persuade the Court it
suggests the need to look beyond the "free marketplace for ideas" rationale to
explain the Court's holding. The Barnette Court itself suggested the answer
when it condemned the flag salute requirement as an invasion of the "sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Con-
stitution to proteet." 64
 Freedom of expression is not merely an instrumentality
to foster intelligent self-government or the advancement of knowledge. 65
 It is
rather, at least in part, in the words of Professor Tribe, "an expression of the
sort of society we wish to become and the sort of persons we wish to be. "66 Pro-
fessor Emerson has suggested the same idea noting that the ultimate justifica-
tion for freedom of expression has to do with the right of an individual as an in-
dividual — that is, the right of an individual to the development of his own per-
sonality and the realization of his own potential free from government interfer-
ence. 57 Thus the answer to Justice Frankfurter's argument is that although
compelling one to recite the pledge of allegiance may not interfere with the
"free marketplace for ideas," it does infringe upon what may be called the in-
dividual's interest in selfhood."
Despite the Barnette Court's suggestion that the injury inflicted upon in-
dividual interests when government compels expression has to do with the indi-
vidual interests in the self, the Court did not explain the precise nature of the
infringement. Of course the compulsion in Barnette was so repugnant to any
concept of individual freedom of conscience that careful analysis of the nature
of the infringement would have seemed almost pedantic. 69 Nevertheless, such
analysis is necessary in order to examine the application of the Barnette rationale
to other less obvious circumstances.
When government compels expression it may infringe upon the individual
interest in the self in at least two distinct ways: first, it may interfere with the
individual's ability to define the persona he presents to the world; and, second,
it may interfere with the individual's freedom of conscience. With respect to
" Id. at 642.
64 Id. The Court made a similar observation in Wooley: "The right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'in-
dividual freedom of mind.' " Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
65 See generally EMERSON, supra note 58, at 3-15; TRIBE, supra note 2, S 12-1.
66 TRIBE, supra note 2, S 12-1, at 576.
" EMERSON, supra note 58, at 4-5.
68 TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 15-5. Professor Tribe describes this interest as an ingredient in
a broader concept of rights of "personhood." See generally id. 55 15-1 to -21. These rights derive in
part from the first amendment and in part from the "penumbras" and "shadows" of other con-
stitutional guarantees. Id. 5 15-3. See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (The
Court stated that "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion."). Id,
69 See supra text and notes at notes 7.17.
70
 TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 15-1 at 888.
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the first of these interests Professor Tribe has stated, "freedom to have impact
on others — to make the 'statement' implicit in a public identity — is central to
any adequate conception of the self.”" What one chooses to say or not to say
helps define one's public identity. When government compels an individual to
express a particular view it deprives the individual of the opportunity to remain
silent, and thereby deprives the individual of control over the persona he pre-
sents to the world. Whether or not the individual agrees with the views he is re-
quired to express, and whether or not others perceive his coerced expression as
sincere make no difference. If compelled expression is perceived as sincere it
communicates either the individual's true views or alternatively, and perhaps
even worse, a misimpression of the individual's views. The individual could
correct any such misimpression, of course, only by disclosing his true views. If
the compelled expression were perceived as insincere, however, the individual's
true views would be suggested by negative implication. When one is thus
deprived of the right to remain silent the essence of the injury to individual
negative first amendment interests is the deprivation of the individual's
freedom to decide how he will present himself to the world!'
The other way in which compelled expression infringes upon the in-
dividual interest in selfhood is by interfering with individual freedom of con-
science. Unlike the interest in the projection of public identity, which focuses
outward on the individual's impact upon others, the interest in freedom of con-
science focuses inward on the individual's self-perception. When government
compels expression the individual subject to the compulsion is likely to view
compliance as acquiescence in, if not as outright affirmation of, the views in-
voluntarily expressed. Consequently one who submits to such compulsion is
likely to feel humiliated and ashamed that he did not stand up for his own be-
liefs. Thus, for the state to compel expression constitutes a direct and powerful
affront to the individual as an individual because it requires a denial of the self
and represents the ultimate submission of the individual — submission of
mind. 72
7 ' The interest in keeping one's views private as it relates to individual control over the
projection of a public identity must be distinguished from the interest in keeping one's views or
associations private for the purpose of avoiding harassment. Disclosure of an individual's
adherence to unpopular views or membership in or support of unpopular organizations can sub-
ject the individual to harassment and thereby discourage expression of unpopular views or
membership in unpopular groups. Accordingly the Court has protected such information from
involuntary disclosure to avoid any chilling effect upon the affirmative exercise of the rights of ex-
pression and association. See note 3 supra.
The interest in the privacy of one's thoughts as it relates to individual control over the
projection of a public identity is different. It does not focus on potential indirect chilling effects
upon exercise of affirmative first amendment rights. Rather it focuses upon the direct effect of
disclosure of one's views upon the definition of his public identity. In other words it is a negative
first amendment interest in the privacy on one's thoughts and it is completely independent of any
chilling effect upon affirmative first amendment interests.
" Although the Court did not speak specifically in terms of freedom of conscience, the
injuries to individual interests in Barnette and Wooley were to this interest. See infra text and notes at
notes 109-17. The magnitude of the affront to the individual is suggested by the familiar story of
William Tell, the Swiss patriot who shot an apple from his son's head rather than bow to the
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It is important to emphasize that the infringement of individual freedom
of conscience resulting from compelled affirmation of belief has to do with the
individual's self-perception. It arises from the individual's own response to his
compliance with the government's requirement. Its essence is the individual's
feelings of shame and disgrace resulting from his inability or unwillingness to
defy the state on a matter of principle. Thus, unlike infringement of the interest
in the projection of a public identity, infringement of the interest in freedom of
conscience does not depend on any message conveyed to others. Rather, an in-
dividual submitting to compulsion to affirm a belief contrary to his own might
well experience feelings of humiliation, even if no one else witnessed or knew of
his actions.
Thus, compelled expression may infringe upon at least two distinctly dif-
ferent aspects of the more general interest in selfhood: the interest in projection
of a public identity; and the interest in freedom of conscience. In any given case
the question must be whether either of these interests has been infringed and, if
so, to what extent. With that in mind, let us examine the factors suggested by
the Court to distinguish among the cases.
B. Analytical Factors Suggested by the Court
1. Freedom to Disavow
One of the factors suggested by the Pruneyard Court to distinguish Pruneyard
from Wooley was that in Pruneyard the shopping center owners were free to
disavow any connection with the message conveyed by petitions circulated on
shopping center property." The flaw in this distinction, however, is that the
plaintiff in Wooley was equally free to disavow agreement with the state motto
he was compelled to display on his license plate. 74 It is true, as the Pruneyard
Court noted," that the plaintiff in Wooley was not permitted to cover up the
state motto." Nevertheless, he was free to indicate his disagreement with it in
any manner which would not physically obscure the license plate. For example,
he might have displayed a bumper sticker proclaiming his disagreement with
the state motto." The plaintiffs in Barnette and Abood were likewise free to
disavow the messages they were compelled to express." Thus the opportunity
to disavow simply does not distinguish the cases factually.
Austrian governor's hat. For a reference to this story see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1943).
73 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). But see id. at 99
(Powell, J., concurring, suggests that freedom to disavow cannot restore the right to refrain from
speaking at all.).
74 See note 77 infra. See also supra text and notes at notes 20-24.
76 luneyard, 447 U.S. at 87.
76 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707.
77 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707. This solution was specifically noted by Justice Rehnquist in
his dissent. Id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78 This point was specifically raised by Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Barnette. West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 664 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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More fundamentally, freedom to disavow a message one has been com-
pelled to express is simply irrelevant to the injury inflicted by such compulsion
in the first place. Once government compels expression any individual sub-
jected to the compulsion is deprived of the opportunity to refrain from speaking
out at all." This is so whether or not the individual avails himself of any oppor-
tunity to disavow. Thus, disavowal simply fails to remedy the loss of control
over the projection of one's public identity. 8° Similarly disavowal cannot
redress any infringement of individual freedom of conscience.'" It seems
unlikely that one compelled to affirm a belief contrary to his conscience would
feel vindicated simply by later announcing that he had not really meant what
he said. Although the remedy of more speech may be effective in some con-
texts82 it is of little use in the area of negative first amendment interests."
2. The Content-Based/Content-Neutral Distinction
Another, and perhaps superficially more persuasive, basis on which the
Court sought to distinguish Pruneyard from Wooley was that in Pruneyard the state
had dictated no particular message. 84 In Wooley, it will be recalled, the state
specifically required the plaintiff to display the state motto on his license
plate. 85 By contrast, in Pruneyard the state merely refused to permit the shop-
ping center owners to eject individuals peacefully circulating petitions on shop-
ping center property. 86 Even if this is viewed as a requirement that the shop-
ping center owners permit use of their property as a forum for expression by
others, the state did not require the shopping center owners to assist the expres-
sion of any particular message in this manner. The requirement in Pruneyard
might thus be described as content-neutral in contrast to the requirement in
Wooley which might be described as content-based.
It is usual to distinguish between content-based and content-neutral inter-
ferences with expression in the analysis of affirmative first amendment issues."
One role of the first amendment is to insure the opportunity for full and free
78 See supra text and note.at note 71.
88 See discussion of the interest in control over the projection of a public identity in text
Section II A supra.
" See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in text Section II A supra.
82 More speech may be an effective remedy where the injury flows from speech. If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 347, 377 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring).
83 In fact a distinct negative first amendment issue arises only in cases where disavowal
is not prohibited. If disavowal were prohibited, and no such case has been found, that prohibition
would infringe upon affirmative first amendment interests, and relief could be based on protec-
tion of affirmative first amendment interests without reference to negative first amendment in-
terests.
" Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
85 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977).
86 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 77-79.
87 See generally TRIBE, supra note 2, §5 12-2 to -3.
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discussion of matters of public concern — that is, to protect a "free market-
place of ideas."" From this perspective the danger inherent in government
discrimination against particular views is obvious. If government can suppress
particular doctrines, it can silence its critics and perpetuate error. This danger
is not limited to restrictions which totally suppress expression of certain view-
points. Even a time, place or manner restriction of a specific message may in-
hibit or hinder its expression." Consequently government restriction aimed at
specific content is presumptively invalid and is subjected to very rigorous
scrutiny. "
Content-neutral government restrictions which affect expression only in-
directly do not portend the same dangers for freedom of expression. Because
the interference with expression is not related to the message, content-neutral
regulation is not a practical means to stifle government critics or to suppress
specific doctrines. With respect to the marketplace metaphor, content-neutral
regulation leaves unaffected the variety of ideas available while restricting only
the size or the hours of the marketplace generally. Thus, the rigorous scrutiny
applicable to content-based restrictions is unnecessary for content-neutral
restrictions. 9 ' Of course even a content-neutral restriction could eliminate a
particular medium of expression altogether. Consequently, content-neutral
restrictions are valid only if they do not unduly restrict expression. 92 This in-
quiry necessarily requires balancing of the public interest served by a given
restriction against its impact upon expression."
While the content-based/content-neutral distinction is appropriate in the
affirmative first amendment context, it does not appear applicable to the
" See supra text and notes at notes 58-60.
69 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (city ordinance pro-
hibiting picketing except labor picketing within 150 feet of schools held violative of the fourteenth
amendment because it was not content-neutral). But see Greet; v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(military regulation banning speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature on army
base upheld). Professor Tribe suggested that Greer may imply that a less rigid test of content-
neutrality may apply to non-public forums. See TRIBE, supra note 2, S 12-21, at 691 & n.21.
96 See generally TRIBE, supra note 2, 55 12-2 to -19.
91 See TRIBE, supra note 2, S 12-20.
92 Compare Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (Court struck down or-
dinance prohibiting any person from knocking on doors, ringing doorbells or otherwise summon-
ing any resident to the door for purposes of delivering handbills) and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939) (ordinance banning all public distribution of handbills held invalid) with Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding antinoise ordinance prohibiting a person from
willfully making noise tending to disturb school sessions) and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966) (upholding conviction of petitioners for criminal trespass where petitioners had engaged in
demonstration on the grounds of the county jail to protest arrests of others). Cf. Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding military regulation banning partisan political speeches and
demonstrations from military base). See also TRIBE, supra note 2, 5 12-2, at 581-82, 12-20.
93
 See generally TRIBE, supra note 2, 12-20. One commentator has pointed out that this
balancing is at the margin" weighing the incremental promotion of the public interest against
the incremental interference with free expression. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 & n.16
(1975).
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negative first amendment context." The dangers implicit in government dis-
crimination against particular views do not arise when government discrimi-
nates in favor of particular views, at least when it does so either by expressing
those views itself or by compelling others to express them. It has been sug-
gested that the "free marketplace of ideas" may be undermined as readily by
government protection of particular views as by government restriction of par-
ticular views. 95 However, this proposition as stated is too broad. Of course
special protection of particular views is often tantamount to a restriction upon
all other views. Where government protection of particular views works a con-
comitant restriction.on other views, government protection is as injurious to
freedom of expression as government restriction. Indeed government protec-
tion of specific content is in such cases indistinguishable from government
restriction of specific content. Thus the Court has held for example that an or-
dinance prohibiting all picketing except labor picketing near schools is invalid
as a content-based restriction of all non-labor picketing." However, when
government discrimination in favor of particular views takes the form of the
government's merely adding its own voice to the throng on behalf of that view,
there is no concomitant restriction on the expression of other views. Govern-
ment expression does affect the relative quantity of expression of various views
but does not restrict any expression on the basis of content. 97 Similarly, govern-
ment compelled expression does not restrict expression of any specific views
but, rather, only affects the relative quantity of all expression. Even if govern-
ment can create a false sense of support for a certain view by forcing expression
of it, no restriction of other views occurs. Thus, while compelled expression
may infringe upon individual interests it should not be condemned as an in-
terference with the "free marketplace of ideas."
94 This point appears to be what Justice Powell had in mind in his concurring opinion
in Pruneyard when he stated, "But even when no particular message is mandated by the State,
First Amendment interests are affected by state action that forces a property owner to admit
third-party speakers. In many situations, a right of access is no less intrusive than speech com-
pelled by the State itself." Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 98 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring).
95 Ely, supra note 93 at 1506-08. Professor Ely's argument is that statutes prohibiting
desecration or improper use of the flag are not truly content-neutral. Although such statutes are
neutral in the messages they inhibit, they single out the particular message conveyed by the flag
for special protection. Thus Professor Ely argues that such statutes should be subjected to the
more demanding scrutiny associated with content-based regulations. A statute prohibiting
desecration of any privately owned symbols would present a different case. Id. at 1507 n.101.
96 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
97 Government is generally free to engage in expression so long as it does not violate the
establishment clause. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (state may legitimately
communicate an official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride and individualism
in any number of ways). Cf. Buckley v. Valet), 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 & n.127 (1976) (Court rejected
any analogy between the establishment of religion and public financing of political campaigns
because government may facilitate expression); but see id. at 248-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting on
this issue). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-716 (1970);
TRIBE, supra note 2, $ 12-4, at 590 & n.8; Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits
of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578 (1980).
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Moreover, the content-based/content-neutral distinction also fails to help
identify negative first amendment cases in which the infringement of individual
interests is particularly severe. For example, the Court held in Barnette that the
state may not require school children to recite the pledge of allegiance." Sup-
pose instead a state requirement that school children recite, not the pledge of
allegiance per se, but rather, a message to be selected by some nongovernment
entity, and that the message selected happened to be the pledge of allegiance."
Although in this case the government would not have mandated any particular
message, the infringement of individual interests would not seem any less
severe. The essence of the infringement in either case is the denial of individual
freedom of conscience and in this regard the two cases are indistinguishable.'°°
Similarly it makes little difference whether it is the government or the
nongovernmental entity that chooses the specific message with respect to in-
fringement of the individual's interest in control over the projection of his
public identity.'°'
3. The Nexus Between the Individual and the Message
The third basis on which the Court sought to distinguish Pruneyard from
Wooley was that views expressed by the public in circulating petitions on shop-
ping center property would not likely be identified with those of the shopping
center owners. The Court described this identification factor as the most im-
portant of the three distinctions it had suggested."' By definition government
cannot infringe upon individual interests by compelling expression unless what
it compels constitutes expression. When, as in Barnette, the state forces in-
dividuals to recite the pledge of allegiance or salute the flag"' government has
clearly compelled expression. However, when the government requires only
that an individual participate in some less personal and less direct manner in
the expression of a message the infringement of individual interests is less clear.
In such a case, as the required participation becomes less direct and personal
the likelihood decreases that compliance will identify the individual with the
message expressed. Unless the government requires an individual to do some-
thing which reasonably identifies him with a message it is difficult to describe
the government's action as compelling expression.
Negative first amendment interests are infringed when government by
compelling expression interferes with individual control over the projection of
99 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635, 642 (1943).
99 This is in effect what happened in Prunryard. The government required the shopping
center owners to permit others to circulate petitions on shopping center property. The particular
petitions to be circulated were chosen by the individuals desiring to circulate them, not by the
government. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1980).
i" See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in text Section II A supra.
See discussion of the interest in control over the projection of a public identity in text
Section II A supra.
1
°2 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1943).
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one's public identity' 04 or deprives the individual of freedom of conscience.'"
In either case the infringement requires that the individual somehow be iden-
tified with some message. The interest in projection of a public identity in-
volves the way in which others perceive the individual. Infringement occurs
when that perception is affected because the individual has been forced to speak
out when he might have preferred to remain silent. However, unless others will
identify some particular message with the individual, he has not been forced to
speak out in any meaningful sense and his public identity will not be affected.
Infringement of the interest in freedom of conscience occurs when the in-
dividual is forced to affirm a belief he does not hold. Coerced affirmation of
belief constitutes an affront to personal dignity because the individual is likely
to feel humiliated and ashamed that he did not stand up for his own beliefs.
This may occur whether or not the compelled acts communicate anything to
others. It cannot occur, however, unless the compelled acts associate the in-
dividual at least in his own mind with particular beliefs he finds objectionable.
In Wooley v. Maynard, for example, the state did not actually require the
plaintiff to say anything.'" It merely required him to display on his automobile
a license plate bearing the state motto.'° 7 Consequently Justice Rehnquist
argued in dissent that the state had not compelled any expression because it
had not forced the plaintiff to say anything or "to communicate ideas with
nonverbal actions reasonably likened to 'speech' such as wearing a lapel button
. . . or waving a flag."'" It is true that, had plaintiff complied with the license
plate requirement, it would seem highly unlikely that anyone would have re-
garded plaintiff's compliance as an expression of plaintiff's views concerning
the state motto. Thus, Justice Rehnquist seems correct in concluding that the
state did not force the plaintiff to communicate anything to others. Accordingly
it would appear that there was no infringement of the plaintiff's interest in
maintaining control over the projection of his public identity.'"
It does not necessarily follow, however, that there was no infringement of
the plaintiff's interest in freedom of conscience. Such infringement does not re-
quire that the individual be forced to communicate anything to others."° It re-
quires only that the individual himself can reasonably view what he is forced to
do as an involuntary affirmation of a belief."' In this connection Justice Rehn-
quist seems incorrect in suggesting that displaying a license plate bearing the
state motto is inherently unlike "speech."" 2 The reason why others would not
104 See discussion of the interest in control over the projection of a public identity in text
Section II A supra.
101 See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in text Section II A supra.
1" Wooley, 430 U .S. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
I" Id. at 707. See supra text and notes at notes 20-32.
109
1 °9 See discussion of the interest in control over the projection of a public identity in text
Section II A supra.
"° See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in text Section II A supra.
111 Id.
12 Wavle)), 430 U .S. at 720.
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likely have regarded compliance with the license plate requirement by plaintiff
as an expression of plaintiff's views is simply that everyone else was also re-
quired to display similar license plates on their automobiles. Consequently
they probably would have paid little or no attention to plaintiff's doing the
same. Had plaintiff been the only one required to display such a license plate,
others who saw it might well have regarded it as an expression of the plaintiff's
views. After all, it is a common form of expression to attach slogans to one's
personal property, including automobiles — witness the frequency of bumper
stickers and even personalized license plates.
Although the generality of the license plate requirement rendered it
unlikely that others would regard plaintiff's compliance as an expression of his
views, the general applicability of the requirement has little bearing on how the
plaintiff himself would view his own compliance. In Barnette, for example, all
students were required to recite the pledge of allegiance. 13 It is probable,
therefore, that the other students would not necessarily have regarded com-
pliance as an expression of anyone's personal views. Nevertheless, that did not
diminish the plaintiff's conscientious scruples over reciting the pledge. The
essence of the infringement of freedom of conscience is the individual's own
feeling that he has been false to his own beliefs."+ This interest, therefore, does
not depend on how others interpret his actions. Indeed one might be just as
reluctant to affirm a belief contrary to his conscience even if no one else were
aware of it. To determine whether a particular government requirement in-
fringes upon freedom of conscience the crucial inquiry is not whether com-
pliance would communicate any message to others, but rather, whether com-
pliance could reasonably be regarded by the individual himself as an affirma-
tion of or acquiescence in some belief.
In Wooley, two sets of circumstances combine to suggest that the plaintiff
could reasonably have regarded compliance with the state's requirement as an
involuntary affirmation of a belief. First, displaying a slogan is generally an ef-
fective means to express the slogan's message. That others might not.perceive
the display as an expression of the individual's views is not important because
the individual himself, sensitized by his opposition to the slogan, would not
miss the suggestion. Second, the plaintiff's compelled involvement in the
display of the state motto was direct and personal. As the Court noted, and in-
deed deemed critical, the plaintiff was required to display publicly the state
motto as part of his daily life on his personal property. "s Moreover, an auto-
mobile is a possession which is readily associated with its owner. Thus, it seems
reasonable that the plaintiff might view compliance with the state requirement
as some acquiescence in the views suggested by the state motto.
The inference of acquiescence is, of course, more compelling when an in-
dividual actually recites a pledge rather than merely displays a motto on his
"3 See supra text and notes 7-10.
114 See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in text Section II A supra.
" 5 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
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license plate. Recitation is one of the most direct and personal ways one could
be involved in expression. While identification of an individual with a message
displayed upon his personal belongings can be problematic, identification of an
individual with his spoken words is virtually inescapable. This is why the Court
considered the infringement in Wooley to be less severe than the infringement in
Barnette. ] f 6 Nevertheless, it seems evident that forcing an individual to display
on his license plate a message which he opposed could cause significant pangs
of conscience. Imagine, for example, being forced to display a license plate
bearing a Nazi slogan or a racial slur. Thus, the Court was correct in con-
cluding that the license plate requirement in Wooley worked a significant in-
fringement of individual interests.'"
In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins," 8 the shopping center owners, like
the plaintiff in Wooley, were compelled to permit use of their property for
dissemination of an ideological message. "9 The California Supreme Court had
held that peaceful circulation of petitions on privately owned shopping center
property was protected by the California Constitution.' 2° Consequently, the
shopping center owners in Pruneyard were unable to eject individuals peacefully
circulating petitions on shopping center property. The circumstances in
Pruneyard, however, were such that any resulting identification of the owners
with the message conveyed by the petitions was extremely remote. The shop-
ping center was large and generally open to the public. 12 ' It would, therefore,
be unreasonable for anyone to infer that the shopping center owners endorsed
all messages expressed on the premises by members of the public.'" It would
similarly be unreasonable for the owners themselves to think that they
somehow endorsed any views expressed by others on shopping center property.
As Barnette, Wooley and Pruneyard suggest, the potential range of the extent
of compelled personal involvement in expression, and thus the potential range
of the degree of infringement of negative first amendment interests, can be
viewed on a continuum. The compulsion involved in Barnettel" represents one
end of this continuum. The compulsion involved in Pruneyard' 24 is perhaps near
the other end. As the compelled involvement in expression of a message be-
comes less personal and less direct, association of the individual with the
message diminishes. It becomes less likely that others will ascribe the views ex-
"6 Id.
117 Id.
18 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
119 Id. at 77-78.
120 See note 48 supra.
121 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 101 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The shopping center occupies
several city blocks. It contains more than 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a theater. Interspersed
among these establishments are common walkways and plazas designed to attract the public.").
122
 Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 87 ("It is ... a business establishment that is open to the
public to come and go as they please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing
out pamphlets ... will not likely be identified with those of the owner.").
1 " See supra text and notes at notes 7-17.
124 See supra text and notes at notes 44-54.
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pressed to the individual involved. Similarly, it becomes less likely that the in-
dividual will view his involuntary involvement as acquiescence. Eventually a
point is reached where the level of personal involvement is so minimal and the
resulting nexus between the individual and the message so remote that no
legally cognizable infringement of negative first amendment interests occurs.
C. Balancing and Negative First Amendment Interests
Whenever a government requirement is challenged on the basis that it
compels expression the initial inquiry must be whether the requirement does in
fact infringe upon negative first amendment interests and if so how seriously.
The judicial task does not end here, however. It is also necessary to consider
what government interests may be served by the requirement in question, and
under what circumstances advancement of a government interest might
outweigh the concomitant infringement of individual negative first amendment
interests.
In Barnette the Court acknowledged that the government purpose in com-
pelling school children to recite the pledge of allegiance was to promote na-
tional unity and thereby advance national security. 123
 In concluding that the
asserted government interest was not sufficient to justify the infringement of in-
dividual interests, the Court noted the futility of seeking to promote national
unity in this manner 125
 and the egregiousness of the infringement of individual
interests."' The Court opined that so intimate an affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind could be required, if ever, only for reasons even more compel-
ling than those necessary to justify suppression of expression.'" The Court
could think of no such situations.'"
In Wooley v. Maynard' s° the Court again acknowledged the need to consider
whether the state's asserted interest was sufficiently compelling to justify the in-
fringement of individual negative first amendment interests."' Although the
Court did not attempt to articulate a particular standard for what would be suf-
ficiently compelling, it took much more care than the Barnette Court to show
that the asserted state interests were not sufficiently important.' 32 The state
argued that displaying the state motto on automobile license plates aided iden-
tification of passenger vehicles and fostered an appreciation of history, in-
129
 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S 624, 640 (1943).
129 Id. at 640-41.
127 Id, at 633.
1" Id. at 633, 642.
129 Id. at 642.
130 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
' 3 ' Id. at 715-16. The Court stated: "Identifying the Maynards' interests as implicating
First Amendment protections does not end our inquiry however. We must also determine
whether the State's countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees
to display the state motto on their license plates." Id.
102 Id. at 716-17.
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dividualism and state pride.'" The Court considered the first asserted interest
insubstantial because passenger license plates were otherwise easily distin-
guishable and noted that in any event this interest could be achieved through
less drastic means.' 34 The state interests in promoting appreciation of history,
individualism and state pride could also be legitimately pursued in other ways
less injurious to individual interests.'"
The greater attention focused on the state interests asserted in Wooley sug-
gests that as the degree of infringement of individual interests decreases, the
Court's deference to competing government interests increases. This tendency
is further exemplified in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.'" There the Court
was unanimous in holding that requiring teachers to pay service fees to the
union which represented them in collective bargaining infringed upon the
teachers' negative first amendment interests.'" Nevertheless, the plurality
concluded that use of service fees for collective bargaining purposes was
justified by the asserted government interest in promoting labor peace through
the elimination of "free riders. " "5 In reaching this conclusion it is significant
that the plurality did not subject the asserted government interest to particular-
ly rigorous scrutiny. They did not question, for example, the extent to which
elimination of "free riders" in fact promotes peaceful labor relations. Nor did
they consider whether the same objective might be obtained by employing any
less drastic measures.' 39 Indeed, several members of the court sharply criti-
cized the plurality for failing to apply established first amendment principles
and require the state to come forward and demonstrate overriding government
objectives.'" The plurality's failure to apply rigorous scrutiny to the asserted
government interest appears to have been based on a tacit assumption that the
infringement of individual interests was not very severe."'
Finally, in Pruneyard the California Supreme Court held that the Califor-
'" Id. at 716.
' 34 Id.
135 Id. at 717.
135 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
137 Id. at 222 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); id. at 243-44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 244-45 (Powell, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 232. See supra text and note at note 43.
139 431 U.S. at 220-23. The Court relied heavily on its earlier decisions in Railway
Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) and International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). However, the questions of to what extent elimination of "free
riders" contributes to, or is necessary for, labor peace were not discussed in those cases either.
Hanson upheld in the private sector context the constitutionality of union shop agreements which
require financial support of the collective bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its
work. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. Street was based on statutory grounds and prohibited the use of
union shop funds for political purposes. Street, 367 U.S. at 769-70. Street, however, did not con-
sider, but rather assumed in view of Hanson, the constitutionality of using shop funds for collec-
tive bargaining purposes. Id, at 749.
isv Abood, 431 U.S. at 262-64 (Powell, J., concurring).
' 4 ' See supra text and notes at notes 150-60.
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nia Constitution protected a right of access to privately owned shopping center
property for the purpose of circulating petitions.' 42 The United States Suprenie
Court rejected the shopping center owners' claim that the California rule
violated their negative first amendment rights without even referring to any
possible state interest. t43 The Court's rejection of the shopping center owners'
contention appears to be based entirely on the conclusion that the degree of in-
fringement of the owners' negative first amendment interests, if any, was so in-
significant as not to be legally cognizable.'"
The Court's position in Pruneyard, then, suggests that the extent to which
compelled expression must serve the public interest to justify subordination of
the concomitant infringement of individual interests depends on the extent to
which the individual interests are infringed. The seriousness or magnitude of
infringement of negative first amendment interests may vary throughout a con-
tinuum ranging from extreme to de minimis.' 45
 Accordingly the degree of ur-
gency necessary for a government interest to outweigh the infringement of in-
dividual interests must vary in response. In other words, negative first amend-
ment cases require a sliding scale approach to balancing. The more serious the
infringement of individual interests, the more vital the asserted advancement
of government interests must be to outweigh the infringement and vice versa.
The question in each case must be whether the compelled participation in ex-
pression infringes unduly upon individual interests.
To summarize, a satisfactory approach to compelled expression requires a
two-step analysis. In any case in which a government requirement is chal-
lenged on the basis that it compels expression the first inquiry must be whether
the requirement works any infringement of individual negative first amend-
ment interests. This inquiry must focus on whether under all the facts and cir-
cumstances compliance with the particular requirement would associate the in-
dividual involved with some message or point of view. Even if the circum-
stances are such that others would not ascribe the views expressed to the in-
dividual involved, the individual himself may regard his compliance with the
challenged requirement as an affirmation of the views expressed. To the extent
that others ascribe the views expressed to the individual involved, the indi-
vidual is deprived of control over the projection of his own identity. To the ex-
tent that he views his own actions as an involuntary affirmation of belief he is
deprived of freedom of conscience. If it is determined that some infringement of
142 See note 48 supra.
143
 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-88 (1980). However, the
shopping center owners had also argued that they had been deprived of their property without
due process of law. In rejecting that contention the Court noted that the state did have an interest
in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition than conferred by the federal
Constitution. Id. at 82-85.
' 44 The Court stated: "We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized prop-
erty rights nor their First Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme
Court's decision . • . ." Id. at 88.
l" See supra text and notes at notes 123-24.
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individual interests has occurred the second step of the analysis involves bal-
ancing that infringement against any government interests furthered by the
compelled expression. It is the first step of this analysis that the Court has
largely ignored. Nevertheless, even meticulous application of this approach
would not shed much additional light on cases like Barnette where the infringe-
ment of individual interests was as severe as it was obvious.'" The suggested
analysis will help, however, in cases like Abood where the underlying fact of in-
fringement is not so clear."'
III. ABOOD-A REEXAMINATION
A. The Nature of the Disagreement Between the Plurality and Concurrence
The Abood Court was unanimous in holding that use of required service
fees for political and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining
violated the first amendment.'" However, the Court was divided significantly
over the use of required service fees for collective bargaining activities. 149 The
disagreement within the Court ostensibly centered on the proper approach to
balancing conflicting government and individual interests. The plurality found
thé government interest in promoting labor peace by eliminating "free riders"
to outweigh the infringement of individual interests. 150 In his concurrence,
however, Justice Powell argued that the plurality had failed to apply an appro-
priately demanding level of scrutiny because the government had not been re-
quired to show that a paramount government interest was served by agency
shop. 151
The dispute as to the appropriate level of scrutiny obscures a related but
unarticulated disagreement concerning the severity of the underlying infringe-
ment of individual negative first amendment interests. Neither the plurality
opinion nor Justice Powell's concurring opinion focused on the distinct nature
of the infringement of first amendment interests where government compulsion
rather than government prohibition or interference is the cause of infringe-
ment. Consequently, neither opinion explicitly analyzed the magnitude of the
infringement of individual negative first amendment interests. Nevertheless, it
' 56 See supra text and notes at notes 7-17.
147 See supra text and notes at notes 33-43.
"a Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion); id. at 242-44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
244 (Powell, J., concurring) (1977), See also Galda v. Bloustein, 516 F. Supp. 1142 (D.N.J.
1981). In Galda, plaintiffs, students at Rutgers-Camden College of Arts and Sciences, objected to
paying mandatory but refundable fees added to the bill of every student by the university and
earmarked for the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group. Id. at 1144-46. The Court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, distinguishing Galda from Abood, in part,
on the basis that the judgments in Galda were refundable. Id. at 1148, 1150.
"9 See note 6 supra.
' 5° Abood, 431 U.S. at 222-23, 232.
t5i Id. at 255, 263-64 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
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appears that the dispute between the plurality and the concurrence as to the ap-
propriate approach to balancing the opposing individual and government in-
terests is based on unarticulated but different intuitive judgments as to the
gravity of the infringement of individual interests.
Although the Abood plurality concluded that compelled contributions in-
fringed first amendment interests, 152 the plurality may not have considered the
infringement to be particularly severe. This is suggested in part by the fact that
the plurality upheld use of compelled contributions for collective bargaining
purposes without subjecting the asserted government interest to rigorous
scrutiny. More significantly the plurality's only direct reference to the severity
of the infringement was the assertion that the fact that the plaintiffs had been
compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, political contributions
resulted in no less an infringement of their first amendment rights.'"
However, a year earlier in Buckley v. Valeo' 54 the Court in upholding federal
limits on political contributions'" had said specifically that limits on political
contributions involve only a marginal restriction upon free communication. 156
Unlike the plurality at least three concurring justices definitely considered
the infringement of first amendment interests in Abood to be significant. Justice
Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, 157 stated:
I agree with the Court as far as it goes, but I would make it more explicit
that compelling a government employee to give financial support to a union
in the public sector — regardless of the uses to which the union puts the con-
tribution — impinges seriously upon interests in free speech and association
protected by the First Amendment.'"
The whole thrust of Justice Powell's concurring opinion is that public sector
agency shop has a serious impact upon first amendment interests and must,
therefore, be subject to an exacting level of scrutiny. 156 According to Justice
Powell, in approving use of service fees for collective bargaining purposes, the
plurality failed to apply an appropriately rigorous level of scrutiny. He pointed
out that the plurality not only failed to require the state to prove that its actions
were justified by an overriding state interest, but that the plurality in fact
12 Id. at 235-36 (Steward, J., plurality opinion).
153 Id. at 234-35.
154 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
155 Id. at 29.
158 Id. at 20-21. The Court stated:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity
of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of
his contribution, since the expression rests solely on undifferentiated, symbolic act
of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of
the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.
Id. at 21.
152 Id. at 244. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which the Chief Justice and
Justice Blackmun joined.
358 Id. at 255 (Powell, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 254-56, 264.
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reversed the burden and placed it on the individual.' 60 Of course, if the in-
fringement were as severe as Justice Powell suggested, rigorous scrutiny would
seem appropriate. The difficulty with Justice Powell's argument, however, is
that he did not explain why the compelled contributions in Abood constituted so
serious an infringement.
Thus, both the plurality and the concurrence skirted the central problem
in Abood — how seriously did the compelled contributions infringe upon in-
dividual negative first amendment interests? Indeed analysis of that issue was
largely foreclosed by the Court's failure to focus on the distinct nature of the in-
jury to individual interests when government compels rather than prohibits ex-
pression. This lacuna in the Court's analysis served to obfuscate the real nature
of the disagreement between the plurality and the concurrence.
B. The Magnitude of the Infringement in Abood
Infringement of individual negative first amendment interests can occur
in two ways. First, compelling an individual to participate in expression may
interfere with the individual's projection of a public identity.' 6 ' Second, it may
interfere with the individual's freedom of conscience.'" In either case,
however, the infringement depends on association of the individual with some
message.' 63 Several circumstances in Abood suggest that any association of in-
dividual teachers with views ultimately expressed by the union was probably
minimal. In Abood, and indeed in any agency shop situation, any association of
the individual with the views expressed by a union is likely to be remote. A
union is a separate entity. Any views expressed by a union, which is a ma-
joritarian institution, can reasonably be understood only as the views of the in-
stitution and not as those of any individual member.'" Furthermore, the
160 Id.
16 ' See discussion of the interest in control over the projection of a public identity in Sec-
tion II A. supra.
162 See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in text Section II A supra.
160 See supra text and notes at notes 102-24.
164 Cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 859 (1961) (Harlon, J., concurring). Lathrop
involved a challenge to the annual dues requirement of the Wisconsin State Bar. Id. at 822 (Bren-
nan, J., plurality opinion). The plaintiff contended that the bar's use of his dues in part to
finance political activity violated his first and fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 822-23, 827.
The plurality held that the state bar may impose dues requirements to finance activities which
elevate the educational and ethical standards of the bar. Id. at 843. Because the plaintiff's com-
plaint lacked concreteness, the plurality did not address whether the use of state bar dues for
political purposes violates the plaintiff's first amendment rights. Id. at 845-48. In his concurring
opinion, however, Justice Harlan discussed the plaintiff's contention that required state bar dues
payments amount to a compelled affirmation of belief. Id. at 857-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). In
rejecting the plaintiff's argument, Justice Harlan agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
opinion that "everyone understands or should understand that the views expressed are those of
the State Bar as an entity separate and distinct from each individual." Id. at 859 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See also Galda v. Bloustein, 516 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 n.10 (D. N. J. 1981) (The court
deemed frivolous plaintiff's argument that, due to university policy of requiring student to make
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general public is unlikely even to be aware of any particular individual's finan-
cial support compelled by an agency shop agreement. Without that knowledge
it is impossible to draw any inference, mistaken or otherwise, about the in-
dividual's views based on his financial support of the union. Other employees
who would be aware of an individual's financial support would also be aware of
the agency shop agreement and, therefore, could not reasonably conclude that
the individual's views coincided with those expressed by the union. Thus, it
seems unlikely that others would ascribe to the individual employee views ex-
pressed by the union merely because of the individual's compelled financial
support of the union. t65
That no one would likely ascribe the union's views to individual
employees does not conclusively eliminate the possibility of infringement of in-
dividual interests. An employee who opposed the union on principle might still
himself regard his coerced financial contribution as some expression of support
for the union. The remoteness of any connection between individual employees
and any particular views expressed by the union would seem to make it
unreasonable for an employee to view his service fee as an endorsement of any
particular view expressed by the union. Nevertheless, the employee might well
consider his compelled contribution as some general endorsement of the union
as an institution. Unlike the connection between the individual and particular
views expressed by the union, which is remote, the connection between the in-
dividual and the union as an institution is direct. Moreover, making a financial
contribution to an institution is a common means of expressing support for the
institution when not coerced. Yet financial support of an institution is a far less
personal or intimate endorsement of the institution or its principles than the
reciting of a pledge or the giving of a salute or even than the public display of a
slogan or motto on one's personal property. 166
 Financial contributions need not
refundable payments earmarked for the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, his status
as a student at Rutgers automatically associated him with positions taken by the New Jersey
Public Interest Research Group.).
165
 The remoteness of any connection between the individual employee and any views
ultimately expressed by the union is underscored by the difficulty of devising an appropriate
remedy. For example, the Court has said that the individual should not be required to trace his
funds to objectionable expenditures. Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961). Rather, the
Court has suggested a pro rata refund of the percentage of an employee's compelled agency shop
payments equal to the percentage of the union's total budget spent on political and ideological ac-
tivities unrelated to collective bargaining. Id. In Abood the court cited Street on this point and
noted that no lesser remedy should be available in Abood. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 238-39 & n.38, 240 (1977). If the individual employee's funds cannot be traced to any
particular objectionable expenditures it is surely questionable to what extent a pro rata refund
would dissociate the employee from views expressed by the union. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 21 (1976), the Court pointed out that a financial contribution constitutes a symbolic expression
of support for the recipient of the contribution, and that size of the contribution is merely a rough
guide to the intensity of the contributor's support. Id.
"6 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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be conspicuous or even public."' Nor need the individual confront the fact of
his coerced contributions as part of his daily life.
Finally, the government's purpose in requiring service fees militates
against the individual's regarding his coerced payments as an endorsement of
the union. An action which does not in itself constitute expression is not likely
to be viewed as a symbolic expression of any particular message unless the ac-
tion has somehow been associated with the message. If the government
specifically requires an action as a symbolic expression of a particular belief,
the government thereby associates the action with the message. The result is
that an individual would almost certainly regard compliance as a compelled af-
firmation of belief. If, on the other hand, the government specifically requires
an action for reasons other than compelling symbolic expression of any par-
ticular beliefs, any association of the action with any particular message would
be diminished.' 68 Thus, in Barnette when the board of education required all
school children to salute the flag the stated purpose was to require at least an
outward manifestation of a mental attitude of patriotism and respect for the
flag.' 69
 As a result the individuals involved were unlikely to miss the
significance of their compliance as an affirmation of a belief."° In Abood, by
contrast, the purpose of compelling all represented employees to support finan-
cially their collective bargaining representative had nothing to do with man-
dating even an outward manifestation of conformity of thought. Rather, the
purpose was to require all beneficiaries of union representation to share the
financial burdens of that representation."' Because the government so clearly
did not require, or regard, payment of the service fee as a symbolic
acknowledgement of support for the union it may be unreasonable for the in-
dividual to so regard it. 172
1 " In Wooley a. Maynard the Court struck down the state's requirement that the plaintiff
display a license plate bearing the state motto. The Court, however, distinguished the ap-
pearance of the motto, "In God We Trust," on United States currency noting that "[c]urrency
is generally carried in a pocket or purse and need not be displayed to the public. The bearer of
currency is thus not required to publicly advertise the national motto." Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717
n.15.
169
 Whether the government's purpose is to require a symbolic affirmation of belief is
not the same question as whether a government requirement is content-neutral. The content-
neutral/content-based distinction focuses on whether a government requirement works to inhibit
or advance any particular views. See supra text and notes at notes 84-101. Even if a requirement is
content-based in that it advances particular views it may do so by means other than compelling
affirmations of belief. Thus, the focus here is not on whether a government requirement is
content-based in that it ultimately advances particular views, but rather the focus is on whether
the government's purpose is specifically to compel affirmations of belief.
169 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
17° Of course saluting the flag was already recognized as an expression of patriotism.
Thus, in Barnette the government purpose of requiring the flag salute as an expression of
patriotism did not give the flag salute its symbolic meaning. Rather it merely took advantage of
an already existing association of meaning with the gesture.
1 " Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220-22, 224 (1977).
172 An individual might reasonably regard compliance with a government requirement
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In sum, compelled financial support of one's collective bargaining
representative would not seem likely to identify the individual with the union
or its views in the minds of others. Accordingly, there is little or no danger of
infringing upon the individual's interest in control over the projection of his
personality to others. " 3 Nevertheless, there remains some possibility that the
individual would regard his coerced payments as a general endorsement of the
union. " 4 This possibility, too, seems somewhat unlikely because monetary
payments do not constitute a very personal or intimate form of expression, and
because the clear government purpose for the requirement is ideologically
neutral. Thus, while compelled financial support of one's collective bargaining
representative might work some infringement of freedom of conscience the
likelihood and magnitude of any such infringement appear slight. Certainly the
severity of any infringement of individual negative first amendment interests in
Abood falls far short of the magnitude of the infringements involved in Wooley
and Barnette. 15
The Abood Court thus seems correct in finding a constitutional violation at
least where the compelled payments serve no government interest whatsoever. 176
However, because any infringement of individual interests seems minimal, it
as an act of compelled symbolic expression even if the government did not impose the require-
ment for that purpose, so long as the required action was otherwise associated with a particular
message. This might be the case where the required action, like a flag salute, has an already
established symbolic meaning. This might also be the case where refusal to comply with the re-
quirement has been publicly adopted as a means of symbolically expressing dissent. Thus, for ex-
ample, during the Vietnam War compliance with the requirement of registration for the draft
might have been viewed as an expression of support for the war simply because refusal to register
for the draft was used and understood to express opposition to the war.
'" See discussion of the interest in control over the projection of a public identity in text
Section II A supra.
174 See discussion of the interest in freedom of conscience in Section II A supra
175 In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the Court suggested a possible third way in
which compelled financial support of expression might infringe upon first amendment interests.
The argument is that irrespective of any other infringement of individual interests the compelled
support advances views opposed by the individual at the expense of the views he supports. Id. at
355. This view is based on the notion that increasing the quantity of expression of certain views
drowns out expression of opposing views. However, this argument raises several problems. First,
if the connection between the individual subjected to the compulsion and any message ultimately
expressed is insufficient for the individual to view his financial contribution as an involuntary af-
firmation of belief, there is simply no compelled expression. Although the individual has been
forced to pay money he has not been forced to engage in expression. Thus, such a compulsion
might raise due process problems if it were not somehow relevant to a government interest.
However, it is not clear how such a compulsion would implicate first amendment interests. Sec-
ond, it is not clear that increasing the quantity of expression of particular views necessarily
drowns out opposing views. Conceivably it could make expression of opposing views more poig-
nant. Finally, far from there being any first amendment right not to have one's opponents heard,
it is common practice for the government to encourage expression. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 92-94 & n.127 (1976). For a judicial rejection of this "drowning out" argument see
Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 855-57 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, it is sub-
mitted this argument is a "red herring." Any infringement of first amendment interests in Abood
arises from the individual employee's viewing his forced contributions as an involuntary affirma-
tion of support for the union.
176 See supra text and note at note 42.
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might be outweighed by less than a compelling state interest. Elimination of
"free riders" may not be of paramount importance in maintaining peaceful
labor relations. Nevertheless, agency shop at least helps insure that a union will
have the financial resources necessary to discharge its representational func-
tions. Thus, the Abood plurality also seems correct in approving use of agency
shop funds for collective bargaining purposes." 7
CONCLUSION
In the few cases which have raised the problem of compelled expression
the Supreme Court has not focused adequately on the distinct nature of the in-
fringement of individual interests when government compels rather than in-
hibits expression. Consequently, the Court has failed to analyze sufficiently the
severity of the infringement of individual interests in such cases. Indeed, differ-
ing intuitive judgments within the Court concerning the seriousness of the in-
jury to individual interests have remained largely unarticulated, thereby
obscuring the fact that such differences underlie the disagreements concerning
the outcomes in these cases. The result has been a failure to provide any
consistent basis for resolution of the conflict between individual and govern-
ment interests in the negative first amendment context.
Compelled expression may infringe upon individual negative first amend-
ment interests in at least two ways. First, by forcing an individual to speak out
when he would prefer to keep his thoughts to himself he may be deprived of
control over the personality he projects to the world. Second, by compelling an
individual to affirm a belief contrary to his own he may be deprived of freedom
of conscience. In either case, however, there can be no infringement of in-
dividual interests unless compliance with a government requirement somehow
identifies the individual with a message or point of view. The extent to which
the individual becomes identified with a message determines the magnitude of
any infringement of individual negative first amendment interests.
In cases involving claims of infringement of negative first amendment in-
terests the Court should evaluate more explicitly the seriousness of the alleged
infringement. This inquiry — which should be based on the extent to which the
compulsion in a given case associates the individual with the message expressed
— can provide a rational and consistent basis for weighing the opposing in-
dividual and government interests in negative first amendment cases.
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